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Introduction
This Article explores the First Amendment implications of the
Federal Communication Commission's (FCC) regulations issued
under the Cable Television Consumer Protection and Competition
Act of 19921 (1992 Cable Act). The 1992 Cable Act imposes numer-
ous requirements that are beyond the scope of this Article. This Arti-
cle analyzes only the FCC's exercise of rulemaking discretion under
the 1992 Cable Act.
Additionally, it must be remembered that an under-staffed FCC
was given an enormous amount of work to do within fixed time limits.
Therefore, it must be expected that the rulemaking would be vulnera-
ble to second-guessing. Nonetheless, whenever a governmental entity
regulates communications, sensitivity to First Amendment concerns is
mandatory. Moreover, the FCC serves in part as an explicator of elec-
tronic communications law. Thus, the FCC's analysis impacts on innu-
merable other discussions and decisions concerning free speech.
I begin my discussion with an analysis of the general scope of the
power of agencies to consider the constitutionality of legislation.
Next, I explore two particular areas of FCC rulemaking, indecent pro-
gramming and home-shopping, to consider the impact of the FCC's
rules and the underlying First Amendment implications.
I
The Role of Agencies in Constitutional
Interpretation
Like other administrative agencies, the FCC is bound to the role
assigned to it by Congress. The FCC is permitted to issue only those
regulations that are consistent with its congressional charter; the
agency must do what Congress directs and is powerless to act unless it
can point to a particular delegation of power by Congress. As a crea-
ture of Congress, an agency is prohibited from second-guessing its cre-
ator. It is Dr. Frankenstein, not his monster, who gets the last word.
This creates an uncomfortable position for an agency when it ap-
pears that its marching orders might be unconstitutional. In its regula-
tion under the 1992 Cable Act, the FCC stated that it did not have the
power to question the constitutionality of its mandate: "It is a well-
rooted principle that 'regulatory agencies are not free to declare an
1. Pub. L. No. 102-385, 106 Stat. 1460 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 47
U.S.C.) [hereinafter 1992 Cable Act].
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act of Congress unconstitutional."' 2 Insofar as this statement stands
for the proposition that agencies must assume their governing statutes
are valid, the principle is sound. One court stated that it was "impos-
sible to recognize ... any inherent power [in an administrative agency]
to nullify legislative enactments because of personal belief that they
contravene the constitution [sic]." 3
It would be incorrect to argue, however, that the reach of such a
principle could extend to the point where an administrative agency
must refuse to take notice of all of the constitutional questions raised
by its legislative mandate. Agencies are charged with interpreting the
scope of their mandate,4 and the existence of a serious constitutional
question is highly relevant to interpreting the breadth of the constitu-
tional charter. Specifically, agencies should be hesitant to assume that
there has been a "delegation of authority to take actions within the
area of questionable constitutionality. '5 In other words, if congres-
sional language is unclear, agencies are required to choose an inter-
pretation that will avoid serious constitutional questions.
The Supreme Court detailed what it considered the appropriate
approach when an act of Congress "touches the sensitive area of rights
specifically guaranteed by the Constitution. '"6 If there is more than
one way to interpret such legislation, the Court
favor[s] that interpretation of legislation which gives it the greater
chance of surviving the test of constitutionality .... We must as-
sume, when asked to find implied powers in a grant of legislative ...
authority, that the law makers intended to place no greater restraint
on the citizen than was clearly and unmistakably indicated by the
language they used.7
Therefore, agencies must interpret ambiguous grants of power in
favor of constitutional requirements. For instance, in Hampton v.
Wong Mow Son,8 the Court held that even though the Civil Service
Commission had been authorized to "establish'standards with respect
2. In re Implementation of Section 10 of the Cable Consumer Protection Act of 1992;
Indecent Programming and Other 'yJpes of Materials on Cable Access Channels, First Re-
port and Order, 8 FCC Rcd. 998, para. 5 n.7 (1993) [hereinafter Indecent Programming]
(quoting Meredith Corp. v. FCC, 809 F.2d 863, 872 (D.C. Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 493 U.S.
1019 (1990)). See Johnson v. Robinson, 415 U.S. 361, 368 (1974). "Adjudication of the
constitutionality of congressional enactments has generally been thought beyond the juris-
diction of administrative agencies." Id. Despite this self-admonition, the FCC did discuss
the constitutionality of its statutory commands and concluded they passed muster.
3. Panitz v. District of Columbia, 112 F.2d 39, 42 (D.C. Cir. 1940); accord Engineers
Pub. Serv. Co. v. SEC, 138 F.2d 936, 952 (D.C. Cir. 1943).
4. Chevron U.S.A. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
5. Greene v. McElroy, 360 U.S. 474, 506 (1959).
6. Ex pane Endo, 323 U.S. 283, 299 (1944).
7. Id.
8. 426 U.S. 88 (1976).
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to citizenship.., which applicants must meet,"9 the Commission was
not justified in issuing a rule barring all noncitizens from federal ser-
vice. The Court noted that because such a broad ban would likely
result in unconstitutional discrimination, the Commission should not
assume the total ban was authorized by federal policy:
[I]t would be appropriate to require a much more explicit directive
from either Congress or the President before accepting the conclu-
sion that the political branches of Government would consciously
adopt a policy raising the constitutional questions presented by this
rule. 10
In assessing the sensitivity of the FCC to First Amendment con-
cerns in its rulemaking under the 1992 Cable Act, it is unfair to blame
the FCC where its hands were tied by Congress. But in those areas
where the FCC was given rulemaking discretion, it was responsible
not only for exercising its discretion within the requirements of the
statute, but, where possible, for construing the 1992 Cable Act so as to
avoid infringing constitutional rights.
II
Indecency
In 1978, the Supreme Court upheld the FCC's ban on the broad-
cast of indecent programming, at least when there was a good chance
that a large number of children were in the listening audience." This
decision meant that legally obscene material could be barred from the
airwaves as it had been outlawed in all other media,12 and broadcast-
ers would risk losing their licenses for airing descriptions or depictions
of sexual or excretory activities or organs in a patently offensive man-
ner as measured by contemporary community standards for the aver-
age broadcast viewer or listener. 13
9. Id. at 111. See Exec. Order No. 10577, 3 C.F.R. 218, 219 (1954-1958).
10. Hampton, 426 U.S. at 113 n.46 (emphasis added); Cf. Peters v. Hobby, 349 U.S.
331, 345 (1955); Ex parte Endo, 323 U.S. at 299-300.
11. FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726 (i978).
12. See Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15 (1973). In Miller, the Supreme Court an-
nounced a three-part test for determining whether material is "obscene," (so-called
"Miller-obscenity") which is unprotected by the First Amendment:
(a) whether the average person, applying contemporary community standards
would find that the work, taken as a whole, appeals to the prurient interest; (b)
whether the work depicts or describes, in a patently offensive way, sexual conduct
specifically defined by the applicable ... law; and (c) whether the work, taken as
a whole, lacks serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific value.
Id. at 24 (internal quotes and citations omitted).
13. See, e.g., In re Infinity Broadcasting Corp., Memorandum Opinion and Order, 3
FCC Rcd. 930, 933 (1987), remanded on other grounds sub nom. Action for Children's
Television v. FCC, 852 F.2d 1332 (D.C. Cir. 1988).
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In the ten years preceding the enactment of the 1992 Cable Act,
federal courts repeatedly struck down attempts to require cable televi-
sion operators to keep indecent programming off their systems.14 The
primary basis for these decisions was that cable differed from broad-
casting because cable television was viewed as being specifically in-
vited into the home by the payment of a monthly fee. Equally, if not
more important, there existed alternate means to protect the unwilling
viewer. The wire that carried the offending program could be blocked
easily by each individual homeowner. The technology of cable, partic-
ularly lock boxes and addressable converters, permitted each parent
to serve as censor, rather than the government. In fact, the 1984
Cable Act had required cable operators to provide such devices to all
who requested them, "[iun order to restrict the viewing of program-
ming which is obscene or indecent."' 5
The 1992 Cable Act contained many provisions dealing with inde-
cent cable programming. Some were self-executing, requiring no ac-
tion by the FCC. For example, cable operators were required to give
advance notice to subscribers of any free preview of a premium chan-
nel which showed "movies rated by the Motion Picture Association of
America as X, NC-17, or R," andblock such programming for all who
request it.' 6
The indecency section which most involved FCC discretion was
Section 10. Although Section 10 is entitled "Children's Protection
From Indecent Programming on Leased Access Channels," it is
designed to deal with a wide range of potentially offensive program-
ming on both leased and public access channels. The major provisions
of this section permit cable operators to prohibit certain programming
from access channels, require operators who do not block leased ac-
cess programming to segregate indecent leased programming onto a
single channel available only upon a subscriber's written request, and
hold cable operators liable for obscene access programming. 7
After announcing that it was not the role of administrative agen-
cies to adjudicate the constitutionality of congressional enactments,
14. Cruz v. Ferre, 755 F.2d 1415 (11th Cir. 1985); Community Television of Utah, Inc.
v. Wilkinson, 611 F. Supp. 1099 (C.D. Utah 1985), affd per curiam sub nom. Wilkinson v.
Jones, 800 F.2d 989 (10th Cir. 1986), affd, 480 U.S. 926 (1987); Community Television of
Utah, Inc. v. Roy City, 555 F. Supp. 1164 (N.D. Utah 1982).
15. 47 U.S.C. § 544(d)(2)(A) (1988).
16. 1992 Cable Act, supra note 1, § 15 (codified at 47 U.S.C. § 544(d) (Supp. IV
1992)). This provision was struck down in Daniels Cablevision, Inc. v. United States, 835
F. Supp. 1, 9 (D.D.C. 1993).
17. Section 10's grant of authority allowing cable operators to ban indecent program-
ming was struck down in Alliance for Community Media v. FCC, 10 F.3d 812, 815 (D.C.
Cir. 1993).
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the FCC analyzed the constitutionality of Section 10 and found the
challenges to be "without merit."' The FCC's constitutional analysis
reveals some misunderstandings that might have contributed to a de-
creased sensitivity to First Amendment interests within the FCC's reg-
ulatory purview.
Perhaps the most peculiar omission made by the FCC was in its
discussion of the precedential value of earlier cases striking down
cable indecency laws. The FCC stated that those challenging the con-
stitutionality of Section 10 had argued that the broadcast analogy had
been rejected and that "some federal courts have found that these
characteristics [uniquely pervasive and uniquely accessible to chil-
dren] do not apply to cable television."' 9 The FCC then cited to a
string of cases, but left out any mention that the Supreme Court had
summarily affirmed one of those decisions, Wilkinson v. Jones.20
A summary affirmance by the Supreme Court should be treated
as a holding reflecting the merits of the case.2 Certainly, a "summary
affirmance ha[s] considerably less precedential value than an opinion
on the merits," but lower courts and agencies are not free to disregard
it.22 In Wilkinson, however, the Supreme Court's affirmance listed
more than one reason for striking down the indecency laws.23 Be-
cause a summary affirmance cannot be read as supporting all of the
different rationales of a lower court opinion, the Supreme Court can-
not be viewed as having decided on the merits that the broadcast
model cannot be applied to cable indecency laws.24 Nonetheless, the
FCC at least should have explored the possible teachings of the
Supreme Court's decision, rather than acting as if it had never
occurred.
18. Indecent Programming, supra note 2, para. 6.
19. Id. (emphasis added).
20. Id. para. 8. The cited cases are as follows: Cruz v. Ferre, 755 F.2d 1415 (11th Cir.
1985); Community Television of Utah, Inc. v. Wilkinson, 611 F. Supp. 1099 (C.D. Utah
1985), affd per curiam, 800 F.2d 989 (10th Cir. 1986); Community Television of Utah, Inc.
v. Roy City, 555 F. Supp. 1164 (N.D. Utah 1982).
21. Hicks v. Miranda, 422 U.S. 332, 344 (1975).
22. Illinois State Bd. of Elections v. Socialist Workers Party, 440 U.S. 173, 180-81
(1979).
23. The lower court had ruled that Utah's indecency law was preempted by the 1984
Cable Act, was unconstitutionally vague, and was an unconstitutional attempt to ban non-
Miller obscene cable programming. Community Television of Utah, Inc. v. Wilkinson, 611
F. Supp. 1099, 1105-17 (C.D. Utah 1985). The Tenth Circuit's affirmance of the district
court did not expand on its reasoning but "affirmed its judgment on the basis of the rea-
sons stated in the opinion." Jones v. Wilkinson, 800 F.2d 989, 991 (10th Cir. 1986).
24. Cf. Mandel v. Bradley, 432 U.S. 173, 176 (1977) (declaring that a summary affirm-
ance "should not be understood as breaking new ground but as applying principles estab-
lished by prior decisions to the particular facts involved").
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A second strange aspect of the FCC's Indecent Programming
analysis is its derogation of the federal cases striking down cable inde-
cency laws. The FCC reasoned that the cases were "decided prior to
[the] Supreme Court's decision in Sable Communications v. FCC, 492
U.S. 115 (1989), which clearly indicates that regulation of indecent
speech is permissible even though the medium is not broadcasting
and, therefore, does not necessarily fit the exact blueprint the
Supreme Court applied in Pacifica to broadcasting."'25
It is disingenuous, at best, to treat Sable as charting new law in
the treatment of indecent programming, and to discount earlier cases
because a subsequent Supreme Court ruling "clearly indicates" the
constitutionality of regulating indecent speech. The Court in Sable
struck down a federal ban on indecent commercial telephone
messages (so-called "dial-a-porn") and expressly rejected pleas to an-
nounce a lower constitutional standard for indecency.26 Rather, the
Court stated that the constitutional test was to retain the traditional
standard whenever government wishes to "regulate the content of
constitutionally protected speech."'27 That is, the government may
regulate speech content only if "in order to promote a compelling in-
terest [the Government] chooses the least restrictive means to further
the articulated interest. 28
The FCC's Indecent Programming decision does eventually indi-
cate its recognition that Sable commands use of the compelling inter-
est test to evaluate indecency regulation in media other than
broadcasting.29 Yet the FCC's implication that the Court clearly indi-
cated a special rule for indecency is troubling.
Similarly, the FCC discounts the earlier federal cases because "in
each of the cited cases, the state or local prohibitions were found to be
overly broad in terms of the content sought to be restricted and thus
stand in stark contrast to the narrow definition of indecency we have
proposed and shall adopt today. '30 In fact, the narrow definition the
FCC adopted for the cable medium, which defines indecent program-
ming as, "programming that describes or depicts sexual or excretory
activities or organs in a patently offensive manner as measured by
25. Indecent Programming, supra note 2, para. 10.
26. Sable Communications of Cal., Inc. v. FCC, 492 U.S. 115 (1989).
27. Id. at 126.
28. Id.
29. Indecent Programming, supra note 2, para. 10. "As Sable and its progeny indicate,
regulation of indecent matter on other forms of expression is constitutionally permissible
provided that it meets the 'compelling government interest' test and is 'carefully tailored."'
Id.
30. Id. para. 9.
1994]
contemporary community standards"'3 1 is virtually indistinguishable
from the definition in the Miami ordinance struck down in Cruz v.
Ferre: "[M]aterial which is a representation or description of a human
sexual or excretory organ or function which the average person, ap-
plying contemporary community standards, would find to be patently
offensive. '32 Had Miami utilized the FCC's indecency definition, the
court would still have found it overbroad based on its conclusion that
the broadcast rationale is inapplicable to cable.
Finally, the FCC states:
[E]ven though cable is not now the universal service the telephone
medium is, nor, as yet, as pervasive as broadcasting in our society, we
note that over 60 percent of television households in this country
now subscribe to cable. As pointed out ... approximately 30 mil-
lion of these homes are provided with an access channel .... It
would thus seem that blocking is a reasonable, appropriate means to
protect the well-being of children in the substantial number of
households that now subscribe to cable services.33
This analysis is also misleading as it relies on a misinterpretation
of the word "pervasive" as used in Pacifica Foundation. The Supreme
Court did not mean "widely used." If it had, telephone service would
surely have been treated in Sable as "pervasive." Rather, the Pacifica
Foundation Court used the phrase "uniquely pervasive presence ' 34 to
describe the specially intrusive nature of broadcasting. Not only does
broadcasting "confront the citizen.., in the privacy of the home," but,
"[b]ecause the broadcast audience is constantly tuning in and out,
prior warnings cannot completely protect the listener or viewer from
unexpected program content. ' 35 Thus, "pervasive" in the Pacifica
Foundation context refers to the inability of people to protect them-
selves from unexpected program content in the home. The number of
viewers, listeners, or subscribers is irrelevant to this question.
Since the FCC acknowledges that any cable indecency rule must
pass the compelling interest test in order to be constitutional, the
FCC's entire discussion in Indecent Programming, entitled "Permissi-
bility of Regulating Indecent Cable Programming," is arguably irrele-
vant for determining the constitutionality of the FCC's indecency
rules. The FCC's analysis, though, reveals such an over-eagerness to
restrict constitutionally-protected speech as to call into question the
31. 47 U.S.C. § 532(h) (Supp. IV 1992).
32. 755 F.2d 1415, 1417 (11th Cir. 1985). The Eleventh Circuit found this law uncon-
stitutional not because it exceeded the definition of indecency but because FCC v. Pacifica
Found., 438 U.S. 726 (1978), could not be applied to cable television, Id. at 1419-20.
33. Indecent Programming, supra note 2, para. 11 (emphasis added).
34. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. at 726.
35. Id. at 748.
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degree to which the FCC was sympathetic to the constitutional con-
cerns its rules raised.
A. State Action
This over-eagerness is best revealed in the FCC's off-hand dismis-
sal of the argument that its regulations authorizing censorship by
cable operators of the programming offered on leased and public ac-
cess channels implicated state action concerns. The FCC's entire anal-
ysis of whether public or leased access channels could be considered
public fora consisted of two statements: a) no federal cases have
"held that cable access channels are public forums."36 and b) access
channels are "similar in purpose and function" to communication
common carriers.37 Thus, censorship of access by a cable operator
was merely the voluntary decision of a private actor and not state
action.
The FCC's reasoning is surprising for a number of reasons. First,
the FCC ignored its own characterization of access channels as public
fora. In removing an FCC rule imposing liability on cable operators
for obscene access programming, the FCC declared:
[A] rule which requires the cable system operator to censor pro-
gramming on a channel set aside as a public forum, to which the
programmer has a right of access by virtue of local, state or federal
law, would impose a system of prior restraint in violation of the
Freedman requirement.
Second, the FCC's bald assertion that no case has held access to
be a public forum appears disingenuous at best. In Missouri Knights
of the Ku Klux Klan v. Kansas City,39 the court was faced with the
City's closing of a public access channel in response to offensive, racist
programming. The court rejected the City's motion for summary
judgment on the ground that the complaint raised a First Amendment
issue.4 Those challenging the City claimed that the access channel
was created as a vehicle for public expression on a first-come, first-
served basis, and that the City, not the cable operator, had ultimate
36. Indecent Programming, supra note 2, para. 22.
37. In re Implementation of Section 10 of the Cable Consumer and Competition Act
of 1992; Indecent Programming and Other Types of Materials on Cable Access Channels,
Second Report, 8 FCC Rcd. 2638, para. 7 n.5 (1993) [hereinafter Indecent Programming,
Second Report].
38. In re Amendment of Part 76 of the Commission's Rules and Regulations Concern-
ing Cable Television Channel Capacity and Access Channel Requirements of Section
76.251, Memorandum Opinion and Order, 87 F.C.C.2d 40, para. 7 (1981) (emphasis added).
39. 723 F. Supp. 1347 (W.D. Mo. 1989).
40. Id.
19941
control over the channel's existence.4 ' The court agreed: "[I]f the al-
legations in the plaintiff's complaint prove true, [the access channel]
was a public forum. '42
Finally, the FCC never states why an access channel should not
be treated as a public forum. The Supreme Court has held that a pub-
lic forum is created when "the State has opened [it] for use by the
public as a place for expressive activity., 43 The fundamental issue is
whether "a principle purpose" for creating the forum was for "public
discourse" and "the free exchange of ideas." 44
Access channels seem to meet this requirement squarely. In the
1984 Cable Act, Congress specifically defined access channels as "des-
ignated for public ... use."' 45 Congress unmistakably intended that
access channels be viewed as creating a forum for the free exchange of
ideas when it termed such channels "the video equivalent of the
speaker's soap box or the electronic parallel to the printed leaflet.",46
If access channels are public fora, then the government has "an
obligation to justify its discrimination and exclusions under applicable
constitutional norms." 47 When policing the programming offered over
this public forum, the cable operator is not acting as a private speaker
but as "the repository of state power. '48 Whether it is the government
or a cable operator specifically empowered by the government to en-
gage in a content-based exclusion of speakers in a public forum, the
constitutional mandates insulating protected speech are unchanged.
The crucial error made by the FCC was its assumption that the
only "speaker" being affected by the access regulation was the cable
operator. Once the FCC "rejected arguments that according cable op-
erators additional control over their cable systems constitutes imper-
missible state action," neither solicitude for constitutionally protected
speech, nor procedural safeguards were found to be necessary.49 If
41. Id.
42. Id. at 1351-52. The court rejected Kansas City's claim that a municipality could
eliminate a public access channel at its complete discretion by holding: "A state may only
eliminate a designated public forum if it does so in a manner consistent with the First
Amendment." Id. at 1352 (emphasis added).
43. Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators' Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37, 45 (1983).
44. International Soc'y for Krishna Consciousness, Inc. v. Lee, 112 S. Ct. 2701, 2706
(1992).
45. 47 U.S.C. § 522(15)(A) (Supp. IV 1992).
46. H.R. REP. No. 934, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 30 (1984), reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N.
4655, 4667.
47. Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263, 267-68 (1981).
48. Home Tel. & Tel. Co. v. City of Los Angeles, 227 U.S. 278, 286 (1913).
49. Indecent Programming, Second Report, supra note 37, para. 29 n.17 (emphasis
added).
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the FCC simply increased the editorial discretion of one speaker then,
of course, there would have been no First Amendment issue. But by
empowering cable operators to ban access programming, the FCC im-
plicitly authorized the silencing of other speakers.
In simplest terms, consider if the FCC had specifically granted
private citizens the right to remove from newspaper boxes any paper
that they "reasonably believed" was offensive to morals. To say that
the subsequent destruction of newspapers was nothing more than vol-
untary private action would be untenable. The blatant governmental
encouragement of the nominally private parties brings the action
within the First Amendment.
In a similar instance, the Supreme Court found state action where
federal regulations authorized, without requiring, drug testing of em-
ployees by private railroads.50 The Court stated that "the fact that the
Government has not compelled a private party to perform a search
does not, by itself, establish that the search is a private one. '51 The
Court stressed that such a simplistic test was inappropriate: "Whether
a private party should be deemed an agent or instrument of the Gov-
ernment ... necessarily turns on the degree of the Government's par-
ticipation in the private party's activities."52 The Court concluded
that by "remov[ing] all legal barriers to the testing," "indicat[ing] its
desire to share the fruits of such intrusions," and "preempt[ing] state
laws.., covering the same subject matter," the Government had done
"more than adopt a passive position toward the underlying private
conduct. '53 These regulatory provisions were held to be "clear indices
of the Government's encouragement, endorsement, and participation,
and suffice[d] to implicate the [Constitution]. " 54
The identical situation is created by Section 10 and the FCC's
regulations. First, from the very title of the section, "Children's Pro-
tection From Indecent Programming on Leased Access Channels," to
its legislative history,55 the government is encouraging and endorsing
the ban on indecent access programming. Second, Congress and the
50. Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives' Ass'n, 489 U.S. 602 (1989).
51. Id. at 615.
52. Id. at 614.
53. Id. at 615.
54. Id. at 615-16.
55. The chief sponsor of § 10, Senator Helms, stated that the purpose of this section
was to "forbid cable companies from inflicting their unsuspecting subscribers with sexually
explicit programs." 138 CONG. REC. S642, 646 (daily ed. Jan. 30, 1992) (statement of Sen.
Helms). See also 138 CONG. REC. S647 (daily ed. Jan. 30, 1992) (statement of Sen. Helms).
"Mr. President, the bottom line is that this amendment will keep decent Americans from
being victimized by the disgusting programs, and the strip shows, and all the rest [of] the
sleaze that runs on leased access channels." Id.
19941
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FCC have "removed all legal barriers" to the cable operator's censor-
ship of access. Third, the FCC announced that Section 10 is to be read
as preempting conflicting state indecency and obscenity laws.56 The
Government has done far more than adopt a passive position toward
the censorship of access programming.
Section 10 and the FCC's regulations constitute such encourage-
ment, endorsement, and participation that a cable operator who cen-
sors access programming pursuant to the law must be deemed an
agent or instrument of the government. Once state action is found,
the constitutional norms must be observed. At a minimum, any cen-
sorship by the cable operator must provide the access programmer
with procedural safeguards: the burden of proving the program is
censurable rests on the censor; there must be judicial review of any
decision by the censor; and any restraint must be for the shortest time
necessary to obtain a final judicial ruling.57 Moreover, the type of pro-
gramming that can be censored is substantially limited.
B. Leased Access
The 1992 Cable Act's provisions dealing with indecent leased ac-
cess programming gave only limited discretion to the FCC. Congress
directly permitted cable operators to prohibit leased access program-
ming which the operators believed "describes or depicts sexual or ex-
cretory activities or organs in a patently offensive manner as measured
by contemporary community standards. '58 As the FCC correctly
noted, the 1992 Cable Act "does not require, or grant specific authori-
zation to, the Commission to implement [this] provision."5 9
For those operators who did not voluntarily opt to use this power,
the FCC was charged with issuing regulations requiring leased access
programmers to inform those operators whether their programs
"would be indecent as defined by Commission regulations," and mak-
ing requirements on cable operators to place all such identified pro-
gramming on a single channel that would be blocked, "unless the
subscriber requests access to such channel in writing."6
To implement this section, the FCC made several decisions. First,
the FCC devised a definition for "indecency" on cable television. Fol-
lowing the broadcast model, the FCC adopted what it termed its "ge-
neric definition of indecency"-programming that "describes or
56. Indecent Programming, supra note 2, paras. 50-51 nn.42 & 44.
57. Freedman v. Maryland, 380 U.S. 51 (1965).
58. 47 U.S.C. § 532(h) (Supp. IV 1992).
59. Indecent Programming, supra note 2, para. 29.
60. 47 U.S.C. § 532(j)(1).
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depicts sexual or excretory activities or organs in a patently offensive
manner as measured by contemporary community standards."'" As
with broadcast, a cable program is to be viewed in context, but unlike
obscenity determinations, indecency is not based on the entire work.
Additionally, the community standards to be met are not those of the
locale where the program is shown, but rather those of the average
subscriber to cable television.
In all likelihood, the FCC carried out the desire of Congress in
using the broadcast model to define indecency. Additionally, particu-
lar issues, such as the decision not to base indecency on the work as a
whole, had been long settled by the FCC as constitutional for the
broadcast medium.62
The choice of a national standard is more problematic. Cable op-
erators strongly supported this standard because of the national distri-
bution of many cable services. National programs likely would be
reduced to standards satisfactory to the most sensitive community if a
programmer had to pass a different standard in each cable system.
Nonetheless, there are problems with the FCC's choice. First, the
FCC's stated reason was, at best, a non sequitur: "Keeping in mind
that the purpose of 'indecency' regulation is to protect children from
exposure to such materials, we believe that this interpretation, not
confined to a specific geographical area or specific 'cable system, is
reasonable and appropriate. 63 There is no connection between the
stated purpose and the chosen interpretation. Knowing that the rule's
purpose is to protect children from "such" materials does not help
select whether to define "such" materials locally or nationally.
Second, what is considered "indecent" for children is hardly an
issue on which there is national consensus. In holding that the Consti-
tution did not require a "national" community standard for obscenity,
the Supreme Court noted:
It is neither realistic nor constitutionally sound to read the First
Amendment as requiring that the people of Maine or Mississippi
accept public depiction of conduct found tolerable in Las Vegas or
New York City .... People in different States vary in their tastes
and attitudes and this diversitv, is not to be strangled by the absolu-
tism of imposed uniformity.
61. Id. § 532(n).
62. See, e.g., FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726, 740 (1978); Action for Children's
Television v. FCC, 852 F.2d 1332, 1340 (D.C. Cir. 1988) ('"merit' does not keep patently
offensive material from being indecent").
63. Indecent Programming, supra note 2, para. 37.
64. Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 33 (1973).,
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The FCC attempted to buttress its decision by citing to Hamling
v. United States65 for the proposition that no precise geographic area is
constitutionally required for the determination of community stan-
dards for obscenity. A closer reading of Hamling, however, reveals
that the Supreme Court ruled that federal obscenity statutes are "not
to be interpreted as requiring proof of the uniform national standards
that were criticized in Miller," and that consideration of the "commu-
nity standards of the 'nation as a whole"' was inappropriate. 66 In-
stead, in federal prosecutions, a juror is to "draw on knowledge of the
community or vicinage from which [he or she] comes in deciding what
conclusion the 'average person applying contemporary community
standards' would reach in a given case."'67
While the FCC has used a national standard for broadcast inde-
cency, Congress does not appear to have considered the question for
cable television. Moreover, the nature of cable communications
would seem to permit a more localized assessment, at least where the
program is only distributed locally. If, for instance, a leased access
programmer only distributed programs on cable systems in a tolerant
community, such as Manhattan, no interest is served by preventing
programming that would be acceptable to the parents in that commu-
nity merely because the nation of cable subscribers might disagree.
Recalling that indecent speech is still protected speech, a two-
tiered standard might have been more appropriate. For programs
broadly distributed, the national standard adopted would have been
suitable. For locally distributed programming the relevant community
standards could have been limited to the specific geographic commu-
nity where the program could be viewed. This duality would have
protected not only national distributors of leased access programming
but also the interests of those communities either more tolerant or
more sensitive than the national average.
C. Public Access
The FCC was given far more latitude in drafting its regulations
for public access channels. Congress charged the FCC with issuing
regulations "as may be necessary" to enable cable operators to ban
public, educational, or governmental access to "programming the
cable operator reasonably believes describes or depicts sexual or ex-
cretory activities or organs in a patently offensive manner. ' 68
65. 418 U.S. 87 (1974).
66. Id. at 105, 107.
67. Id. at 105.
68. 47 U.S.C. § 532(h) (Supp. IV 1992).
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Most notably, the FCC was made to provide an explanation of
the scope of the categories for which access programming could be
prohibited. The FCC was faced with the problem that Congress obvi-
ously did not mean that any of the enumerated categories were to be
applied literally. For example, "promoting" unlawful conduct is fully
protected speech unless "it is directed to inciting or producing immi-
nent lawless action and is likely to produce such action."'69 In the
words of Justice Brandeis, "even advocacy of violation, however rep-
rehensible morally, is not a justification for denying free speech where
the advocacy falls short of incitement .... The wide difference be-
tween advocacy and incitement, between preparation and attempt, be-
tween assembling and conspiracy, must be borne in mind."'70
The FCC wisely chose a constitutionally permissible definition. It
limited "soliciting or promoting unlawful conduct" to mean only that
speech which would "constitute unlawful solicitation of a crime or
would otherwise be illegal" under federal or local law.7'
The FCC also had to define the congressional language dealing
with sexually-oriented material. First, the FCC had to puzzle with the
oxymoronic phrase "programming which contains obscene material."
In non-legal parlance, a program with a sexually graphic scene may
well be said to "contain" obscene material. As a rule of law, however,
the complete programming must be viewed in its entirety. Obscenity
can only be determined by judging whether the work "as a whole
lacks serious literary, artistic, political or scientific value." '72 Thus,
programming as a whole is, or is not, obscene; it does not "contain" a
part that is obscene material. The FCC correctly recognized this dis-
tinction and ruled that the phrase "programming which contains ob-
scene material" was to mean Miller obscene.
The next category, "sexually explicit conduct," is not as simple to
resolve. It is easy to recognize that the First Amendment prevents
literal application of congressional language. Unmodified, "sexually
explicit conduct" is an overbroad category.73 All of the limitations on
sexually-oriented material which the Court has upheld have required
that the material be "patently offensive."
69. Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447 (1969).
70. Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 376 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring).
71. Indecent Programming, Second Report, supra note 37, para. 16.
72. Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 24 (1973); see also Pope v. Illinois, 481 U.S. 497
(1987) (stating that literary, artistic, political, or scientific value are to be determined by a
reasonable person standard).
73. See Erznoznik v. Jacksonville, 422 U.S. 205 (1975) (striking down ban on drive-in
theaters displaying films containing nudity).
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The FCC dealt with this problem by defining "sexually explicit
conduct" as "indecent programming., 74 The Indecent Programming
Court argued that Congress presumably did not mean all three cate-
gories to be coextensive and that each needed to have a separate
meaning?5 The FCC concluded that "indecency" best fulfilled con-
gressional intent.76
Certainly it could be argued that Congress knows enough to say
"indecent" when that is what it means' In fact, Congress was well
aware of the legal meaning of the word "indecent" and had used the
word repeatedly in both the 1992 Cable Act77 and other regulatory
measures.
78
Again, keeping in mind that non-obscene programming is consti-
tutionally protected, the FCC had an array of interpretive options.
First, the FCC could have stated that the phrase "contains obscene
material [or] sexually explicit conduct" should be read together to
mean Miller obscene. As Justice Stewart had argued in Pacifica Foun-
dation, "[u]nder this construction of the statute, it is unnecessary to
address the difficult and important issue of the FCC's constitutional
power. 79
An alternative tactic would have been to take seriously Congress'
deliberate refusal to explicitly use the term "indecent." Under the
maxim expressio unius est exclusio alterius,80 the use of a term other
than "indecent" means that the statute must be interpreted to mean
something different. The focus would then be on the words "sexually
explicit conduct." Under this approach, the FCC could have argued
that something different from both "obscenity" and "indecency" was
being targeted, specifically hard-core explicit sexual conduct. Thus,
access programs could be banned if they explicitly depicted "ultimate
sexual acts"81 without regard to the Miller requirement that the pro-
gramming as a whole lacks serious literary, artistic, political, or scien-
74. Indecent Programming, Second Report, supra note 37, para. 15.
75. Id. para. 14.
76. Id. para. 15.
77. See, e.g., 47 U.S.C. § 5320)(1) (Supp. IV 1992) (requiring the FCC to promulgate
regulations designed to limit "the access of children to indecent programming" on leased
access channels).
78. See Sable Communications of Cal., Inc. v. FCC, 492 U.S. 115 (1989) (striking down
congressional ban on "indecent" telephone services).
79. FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726, 778 (1978) (Stewart, J., dissenting).
80. "[Tlhe expression of one thing is the exclusion of another." BLACK'S LAW Dic-
TIONARY 581 (6th ed. 1990).
81. Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 25 (1973).
[Vol. 17:179
THE FIRST AMENDMENT AND FCC RULE MAKING
tific value and without proving that the programming arouses "a
shameful or morbid" sexual response. 2
The interest in assisting those parents who want to control their
children's viewing of indecent material on cable television is not frivo-
lous. Lock-boxes and addressable converters empower parents to re-
strict their children's exposure. Regulation that either identifies
indecency or otherwise enables parents to identify indecent access
programming would further assist parents. It is regrettable that a con-
stitutionally valid form of assistance was not given.
II
Must-Carry Rules and Home Shopping
In the 1992 Cable Act, Congress imposed mandatory carriage ob-
ligations on cable operators, requiring cable systems to carry local
broadcasters.83 Congress severely limited the discretion of the FCC in
determining whether cable operators should be subject to must-carry
requirements and which broadcast stations would. need to be carried,
but Congress made a special exception for home-shopping stations.
Section 4(g) of the 1992 Cable Act required the FCC to make a de
novo determination as to whether broadcast television stations that
are predominantly utilized for the transmission of sales presentations
or program length commercials are serving the public interest, con-
venience, and necessity.84 Somewhat asymmetrically, the statute
states that if the FCC decided that "one or more of such stations"
serve the public interest, they would qualify for must-carry rights, but
if one or more did not serve the public interest, "the Commission shall
allow the licensees of such stations a reasonable period within which
to provide different programming, and shall not deny such stations a
renewal expectancy solely because their programming consisted
predominantly of sales presentations or program length
commercials." 5
The FCC ruled in favor of the home shopping stations. The 1992
Cable Act had mandated that the FCC evaluate three factors: the
viewing of home shopping stations; the level of competing demands
for the spectrum allocated to them; and the role of such stations in
providing competition to nonbroadcast services offering similar pro-
82. This definition of prurient interest was adopted in Brockett v. Spokane Arcades,
Inc., 472 U.S. 491 (1985) (rejecting a standard of prurient which included normal sexual
response).
83. 47 U.S.C. §§ 534-535 (Supp. IV 1992).
84. Id. § 534(g)(2).
85. Id.
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gramming.86 The FCC concluded that, based on all three grounds, as
well as on evidence showing that these stations "adequately [address]
the needs and interests to their communities" and that a required
change in format would have a destabilizing impact on the minority
ownership of television stations, home shopping stations, as a class,
serve the public interest. 87
The only mention of the First Amendment came when the FCC
considered the additional question of whether home shopping stations
should be eligible for mandatory cable carriage. The primary concern
of the FCC seems to have been ensuring that a ruling on home shop-
ping "not contaminate the current litigation about must-carry rights of
commercial stations generally." 88 After concluding that the plain lan-
guage of the 1992 Cable Act required must-carry status, the FCC
stated "that the failure to qualify certain licensed stations based on
their programming decisions would place the content-neutrality of the
must-carry rules into serious doubt, thereby jeopardizing their consti-
tutionality."8 9 FCC Chair James H. Quello was even more explicit in
focusing on the court challenge to the must-carry rules: "I am con-
cerned that a decision in this proceeding to exclude home shopping
stations from must carry [sic] status solely because of their content
would have jeopardized the legal defense of the must carry rules."'
The FCC may have been overly cautious in this matter. The
three-judge panel which upheld the must-carry rules emphasized that
the rules were content-neutral, and thus not subject to strict scrutiny.91
The main concern, the court stressed, was whether the government
was trying to "effect a degree of content-control. ' 92 Favoring one set
of speakers, such as broadcasters, would not create a First Amend-
86. Id.
87. In re Implementation of Section 4(g) of the Cable Television Consumer Protection
and Competition Act of 1992; Home Shopping Station Issues, Report and Order, 8 FCC
Rcd. 5321 (1993) [hereinafter Home Shopping Station Issues].
88. Id. at 5371 (dissenting statement of Comm'r Ervin S. Duggan).
89. Id. para. 39. In an accompanying footnote, the Commission stated that the must-
carry rules had been found content-neutral but that, "the court noted that the restriction
of a particular type or character of speech might subject a regulation to strict scrutiny." Id.
at 5364 n.11 (construing Turner Broadcasting Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 819 F. Supp. 32 (D.D.C.
1993), vacated and remanded, 114 S. Ct. 2445 (1994), reh'g denied, 115 S. Ct. 30 (1994)).
90. Id. at 5364 (statement of Chair James H. Quello). In a footnote to this sentence,
Chairman Quello stated, "[If the Commission decided to deny must-carry status to a class
of stations because of their content, it would undermine the court's bedrock assumption
supporting the constitutionality of must [ ] carry rules." Id. at 5364 n.1.
91. Turner Broadcasting Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 819 F. Supp. 32, 42 (D.D.C. 1993), vacated
and remanded, 114 S. Ct. 2445 (1994), reh'g denied, 115 S. Ct. 30 (1994).
92. Id. at 44.
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ment problem unless the favoritism "is related to what the speakers
are saying.
93
These concerns would not have been any more implicated if the
FCC had denied mandatory carriage rights to broadcast stations pro-
viding "23 hours of commercial programming per day. '9 4 Commercial
speech, even though protected by the First Amendment, holds a
"subordinate position" to "fully protected speech." 95 The current
Supreme Court test for evaluating regulation of commercial speech is
that such laws "need only be tailored in a reasonable manner to serve
a substantial state interest in order to survive First Amendment
scrutiny. '9
6
In the recent case of City of Cincinnati v. Discovery Network,
Inc.,' the Supreme Court struck down a city's ban on newsracks sell-
ing commercial handbills but not newspapers. 98 The city had at-
tempted to argue that the "low value" of commercial speech justified
the disparate treatment, but it was rebuked by the Court: "In our
view, the city's argument attaches more importance to the distinction
between commercial and noncommercial speech than our cases
warrant." 99
This statement cannot be read too broadly to imply that the
''common sense" distinction between commercial and other speech is
ending."° The admonition given in Discovery Network relates to the
fact that the city's distinction between commercial and noncommer-
cial speech "bears no relationship whatsoever to the particular inter-
ests that the city has asserted."1 1 Since the only interests put forth
were aesthetic and safety interests, the purely commercial nature of
the pamphlets did not affect the city's interests differently than if they
93. Id. at 43.
94. Home Shopping Station Issues, supra note 87, at 5371 (dissenting statement of Er-
vin S. Duggan).
95. United States v. Edge Broadcasting, 113 S. Ct. 2696, 2705 (1993).
96. Edenfield v. Fane, 113 S. Ct. 1792, 1797 (1993); see generally Board of rustees,
State Univ. of N.Y. v. Fox, 492 U.S. 469 (1989) (applying Central Hudson's test for free
speech in sale of housewares in college dormitory); Central Hudson Gas v. Public Serv.
Comm'n of N.Y., 447 U.S. 557 (1980) (regulation barring electrical utility company from
promoting use of electricity violates First and Fourteenth Amendments).
97. 113 S. Ct. 1505 (1993).
98. Id.
99. Id. at 1511.
100. The FCC seems concerned that this statement restricts or prevents limitations of
commercial time on television stations. See, e.g., In re Limitations on Commercial 'lime on
Television Broadcast Stations, Notice of Inquiry, 8 FCC Rcd. 7277, para. 8 n.16 (1993). See
also Home Shopping Station Issues, supra note 87, at 5365-69 (statement of Chair James H.
Quello).
101. Discovery Network, 113 S. Ct. at 1514 (emphasis added).
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had been non-commercial. The Court concluded that the city had not
established a reasonable fit between its goals and its treatment of
commercial speech "[in the absence of some basis for distinguishing
between 'newspapers' and 'commercial handbills' that is relevant to
an interest asserted by the city."' 10 2
Granting must-carry rights to all broadcast stations other than
those which are predominantly used to transmit sales presentations or
program length commercials would bear a substantial relationship to
the particular interests that the must-carry regulations are designed to
serve. Congress found a "substantial [governmental] interest"' 10 3 in
broadcasting because broadcasters engage in "the local origination of
programming"104 and "continue to be an important source of local
news and public affairs programming and other local broadcast serv-
ices critical to an informed electorate.' 1 5 The first policy listed in the
1992 Cable Act, and the only one directly implicating must-carry, is to
"assure that the widest possible diversity of information sources are
made available to the public from cable systems. "106
Unlike newsracks for commercial pamphlets which create the
identical visual blight as racks for newspapers, broadcast stations con-
sisting predominantly of program-length commercials do not affect
the governmental interests in the same manner as other broadcast sta-
tions. The FCC has long been aware that excessive commercialization
might "subordinate programming in the interest of the public to pro-
gramming in the interest of its salability."'0 7 In fact, even when the
FCC deregulated commercial time for broadcast television, it was not
because excessive commercials served the public interest as well as
other programming but because it was expected that "marketplace
forces should effectively regulate commercial excesses."'0 8
102. Id. at 1516.
103. 1992 Cable Act, supra note 1, § 2(a)(8).
104. Id. § 2(a)(10).
105. Id. § 2(a)(11).
106. 47 U.S.C. § 532(a) (Supp. IV 1992).
107. En Banc Programming Inquiry, Report and Policy Statement, 44 F.C.C. 2303, para.
149 (1960).
108. Revision of Programming and Commercialization Policies, Ascertainment Re-
quirements, and Program Log Requirements for Commercial Television Stations, Report
and Order, 98 F.C.C.2d 1076, 1104, para. 63 (1984), affd in part and remanded in part sub
nom. Action for Children's Television v. FCC, 821 F.2d 741 (D.C. Cir. 1987) [hereinafter
Television Deregulation]. The Commission summarized the rationale behind its historic
concern with over-commercialization by stating, "our regulation of commercial practices
has been characterized by the concern that licensees avoid abuses with respect to the total
amount of time devoted to advertising as well as the frequency with which programming is
interrupted for commercial messages." Id. at 1101, para. 55.
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Unless the Supreme Court is prepared to discard one-half century
of jurisprudence, the First Amendment does not deprive the FCC of
its "comprehensive mandate to 'encourage' the larger and more effec-
tive use of [broadcasting] in the public interest."' 9 In 1990, the Court
reaffirmed that "the diversity of views and information on the air-
waves serves important First Amendment values.""' It seems un-
likely that the Court would hold that the First Amendment prevented
the FCC from encouraging and supporting broadcasters who contrib-
ute to the "diversity of views and information" rather than show com-
mercials most of the time.
The must-carry rules would not have been contaminated had the
FCC declined to accord the commercial speech of home shopping sta-
tions the same encouragement as other kinds of programming. In
fact, the FCC's own must-carry rules create a similar dichotomy. Not
all municipally-owned stations are eligible for mandatory carriage
rights. The FCC has ruled that only those municipally-owned stations
that transmit noncommercial programming for educational purposes
at least fifty percent of their broadcast week qualify for must-carry
rights."' One reason the FCC gave for this rule was its belief that
"the 50 percent of programming threshold is an adequate safeguard to
ensure that such station[s] cannot relegate their NCE [noncommercial
educational] programming to undesirable hours."" 2 This apparently
unremarkable Commission judgment did not lead to a finding that the
must-carry rules were content-based. This judgment is based upon the
lack of viewpoint or subject matter discrimination and not a hint that
the distinction reflected "a 'deliberate and calculated device' to penal-
ize a certain group. '
It would be equally permissible to take the special commercial
nature of home shopping stations into account for must-carry pur-
poses. In fact, the FCC did." 4 Congress charged the FCC with deter-
109. NBC v. United States, 319 U.S. 190, 219 (1943). The Court also stated that the
FCC is not merely a "traffic officer" supervising the airwaves but has "the burden of deter-
mining the composition of that traffic." Id. at 215.
110. Metro Broadcasting, Inc. v. FCC, 497 U.S. 547, 568 (1990).
111. 47 C.F.R. § 76.55(a)(2) (1993).
112. In re Implementation of the Cable Television Consumer Protection and Competi-
tion Act of 1992; Reexamination of the Effective Competition Standard for the Regulation
of Cable Television Basic Service Rates Request by TV 14, Inc. to Amend Section 76.51 of
the Commission's Rules to Include Rome, Georgia in the Atlanta, Georgia, Television
Market, Report and Order, 8 FCC Red. 2965, para. 5 (1993).
113. Medlock v. Leathers, 499 U.S. 439, 452 (1991) (quoting Grosjean v. American
Press Co., 297 U.S. 233, 250 (1936)).
114. In re Implementation of Sections of the Cable Television Consumer Protection and
Competition Act of 1992; Rate Regulation, Report and Order and Further Notice of Pro-
posed Rulemaking, 8 FCC Rcd. 5631, para. 516 (1993) [hereinafter Rate Regulation].
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mining "the maximum reasonable rates" that a cable operator may
charge a leased access programmer.115 The FCC ruled that leased ac-
cess programmers must be divided into three categories: those charg-
ing subscribers directly on a per-event or per-channel basis; those
proposing to use their channel for more than fifty percent of their
lease time to sell products directly to customers (e.g. home shopping
networks and infomercials); and all others." 6 The FCC concluded
that it would "require cable operators to charge different maximum
monthly access rates to each category of programmers.""' 7 Thus, the
FCC is already treating home shopping networks differently than
other programmers, without so much as a whisper of un-
constitutionality.
Finally, it is arguable that limiting must-carry rights to broadcast-
ers who are not "predominantly utilized for the transmission of sales
presentations or program length commercials," actually would have
enhanced, rather than jeopardized, the constitutionality of the must-
carry rules. In dissenting from the opinion upholding the must-carry
rule, Judge Williams focused not so much on the editorial discretion of
the cable operators as on the rights of the programmers who were not
eligible for mandatory carriage. Judge Williams stated that broadcast-
ers were being helped at the expense of other programmers who
might now be unable to find channel space on overcrowded cable
systems.' 18
Arguably, home shopping networks do not provide the benefits
sought by Congress because they are not "the leading source of news
and public affairs information for a majority of Americans and the
most popular entertainment medium."' 19 If home shopping networks
are displacing potential cable programmers who do provide these ben-
efits, it could be contended that the impact of the must-carry rules on
competing non-broadcast programmers is "greater than essential to
that furtherance of the [governmental] interest."' 2 ° Without necessi-
tating a case-by-case, programmer-by-programmer analysis, the FCC
could have ordered, as it did in its rate regulation rulemaking, differ-
ent treatment for "home shopping networks . . . and all others.'
121
115. 47 U.S.C. § 612(c)(4)(A)(i) (Supp. IV 1992).
116. Rate Regulation, supra note 114, para. 516.
117. id.
118. Turner Broadcasting Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 819 F. Supp. 32, 59 (D.D.C. 1993), vacated
and remanded, 114 S. Ct. 2445 (1994), reh'g denied, 115 S. Ct. 30 (1994) (Williams, J.,
dissenting).
119. Id. at 46 (quoting H.R. REP. No. 628, 102d Cong., 2d Sess. 50 (1992)).
120. United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 377 (1968).
121. Rate Regulation, supra note 114, para. 516.
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This would have lessened the competitive disadvantage suffered by
non-broadcast programmers, and enhanced the discretion sought by
the cable operators, without noticeable harm to the substantial inter-
ests Congress sought to further.
The First Amendment analysis, though, is not the only relevant
concern. It is not at all certain that the suggested interpretation would
have been statutorily permissible. The language of Congress ap-
peared to limit the FCC to a dichotomous choice: either home-shop-
ping stations are in the public interest and eligible both for broadcast
licenses and must-carry or they are not in the public interest and need
to be forced off the airwaves. If the FCC had thought otherwise, it
might have argued that the public interest in the airwaves was not
coextensive with the public interest to be served by mandatory
carriage.
Alternatively, the FCC could have treated the public interest
standard as having changed after the 1992 Cable Act. Specifically,
those with broadcast licenses now are not only occupying scarce pub-
lic airwaves, they are also occupying cable channel space as well.
Maybe we should expect, and demand, more from those twice
favored.
IV
Conclusion
The FCC was given a thankless task by Congress. The 1992
Cable Act is even more complex than its 1984 predecessor. Further,
Congress has not always exhibited as much sensitivity to free speech
concerns as is desired.
Rather than criticize the FCC, the goal of this Article was to ex-
plore ways of thinking about issues involving free speech and cable
television. The Supreme Court may soon sharpen the questions, but
the FCC of the future will undoubtedly need to fill in the blanks.
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